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NOTE
"DON'T THROW ME INTO THE BRIAR PATCH":
RICO AND RULES OF EVIDENCE
I. INTRODUcTlON
Prosecutors have a difficult task before them. Many criminal
prosecutions involve a series of long and difficult proofs, intended to
demonstrate to a trier of fact that the accused committed the crime in
question. The Federal Rules of Evidence and their state counterparts
can make prosecution of a criminal more difficult than it should be in
some circumstances. An example is a gang member involved in a
drive-by shooting.' A simple murder charge can become a compli-
cated mess. A prosecutor may want to prove that the accused is a
member of a gang in order to show opportunity: for example, the
gang provided him with the gun, and the gang's "turf' included a
particular area of the city. A trial judge has discretion 2 to say that the
great animosity toward gangs in a particular jurisdiction makes this
1 While the recent enhancements in gang-related criminal law are fascinating,
these changes are outside the scope of this Note. Arkansas, California, Florida, Geor-
gia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, and
South Dakota have all passed anti-gang measures by creating gang-related crimes or
providing for sentence enhancement for gang-related crimes. For a detailed treat-
ment of this issue, see David R. Truman, Note, The Jets and Sharks Are Dead: State Statu-
tory Responses to Criminal Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 683 (1995).
The gang references in connection with RICO are convenient examples. They
may also be timely. See Robert A. Destro, The Hostages in the 'Hood, 36 ARIZ. L. REv.
785, 797-801 (1994); Lesley Suzanne Bonney, Comment, The Prosecution of Sophisti-
cated Urban Street Gangs: A Proper Application of RCO, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 579 (1993);
Matthew Purdy, Using the Racketeering Laws to Bring Down Street Gangs, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
19, 1994, at Al.
2 See FED. R. Evm. 403. While murder is, of course, a state crime, most states
have passed rules of evidence that are nearly identical to their Federal counterparts.
This Note's purpose is to examine the options of a state prosecutor in trying a mur-
der: 1) As a simple murder; 2) With other offenses, under state RICO, see infra Parts
III, IV, and V; and 3) With other offenses and a "handoff" to a federal prosecutor,
under federal RICO, see infra Parts II, VI, and VII.
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evidence unfairly prejudicial to the accused. A trial judge may feel
that the general attitude toward gangs would make a jury more likely
to convict simply because of membership, and not because of the facts
of the case.3 If the prosecutor is unable to use gang membership to
put the case together, there may be trouble convincing the jury in a
circumstantial case. In addition, if a prosecutor has evidence that this
particular defendant committed a series of "hits," the trial judge may
also exclude this evidence. Unless those "hits" fit within an eviden-
tiary exception, the trial judge may exclude the evidence, arguing that
3 The assertion that a trial judge might rule against the admission of gang mem-
bership testimony is a matter of some debate. Some courts are cautious about admit-
ting membership evidence. See, e.g., People v. Maestas, 20 Cal.App.4th 1482, 1494-99,
25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 651-53 (1993) (ruling evidence inadmissible because cumulative
and "inflammatory"); People v. Jiminez, 672 N.E.2d 914, 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (fail-
ing to ask potential jurors about bias against gang members reversible error); State v.
Aikins, 932 P.2d 408, 425 (Kan. 1997) (affirming trial court's suppression of any men-
tion of gang membership with a motion in limine); State v. Barnes, 685 So. 2d 1148,
1155 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that gang membership creates "inherent connota-
tion ... [of] criminal activity"; may be harmless, but still error); State v. Palmer, No.
C-960280, 1997 WL 78595, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 26, 1997) (affirming trial court's
threatened mistrial if prosecutor referred to gang membership); Pondexter v. State,
942 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (determining that gang evidence is inad-
missible if used solely to show bad character).
Other courts hold that gang membership is an important part of any case involv-
ing a gang-related incident. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 924 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Ark. 1996)
(ruling evidence admissible if relevant as to grounds for ill feeling in murder case);
People v. Olguin, 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1370, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, 601 (1995) (hold-
ing gang evidence admissible when "highly relevant to the prosecution's theory");
State v. Taylor, 687 A.2d 489, 499-501 (Conn. 1996) (arguing gang evidence admissi-
ble if probative of motive, especially if defendant voluntarily admits to involvement);
State v. Green, 920 P.2d 414, 418 (Kan. 1996) (holding gang evidence admissible if
relevant to impeach defendant); Hoops v. State, 681 So. 2d 521, 530 (Miss. 1996)
(allowing prosecutor to use evidence because court considers gang membership a
"bad act," and therefore admissible as to motive).
For a general discussion of the debate, see John E. Thueman, Annotation, Admis-
sibility of Evidence of Accused's Membership in Gang, 39 A.L.R.4th 775 (1985). Most im-
portantly, the sentiment against admitting membership evidence exists and it may
pose problems for a prosecutor. In the hypothetical discussed throughout this Note,
proof that the murder is "gang-related" may be difficult to obtain, so courts may not
decide whether the probative value of gang membership outweighs its possibility of
unfair prejudice. While some courts have found gang membership probative if the
crime is gang-related, see, e.g., Olguin, 31 Cal.App.4th at 1370, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601;
Hoops, 681 So. 2d at 530, a prosecutor may want to use gang membership evidence to
prove other facts such as an opportunity to possess a gun or to place defendant at the
scene. If the evidence that the crime is "gang-related" is tenuous, the arguments in
favor of admissibility may be more difficult to make.
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its sole function is to demonstrate bad character and propensity to
commit murder.4 This puts the prosecutor in a difficult position.
The picture changes dramatically when the authorities use other
means to prosecute the defendant, such as the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).5 By using a state or federal
RICO statute, there are a broader range of options concerning evi-
dence in the case. RICO is a complex statute with more elements that
must be proven than most crimes.6 What was a matter of discretion
becomes a matter of necessary proof. Gang membership is a criminal
"enterprise." Prior murders come in as a "pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity." Additionally, there is the possibility of bringing down the en-
tire criminal organization along with the accused. In a difficult
evidentiary case, RICO can promote justice.
RICO is complicated legislation. It requires a sophisticated series
of proofs in order to secure a conviction. Would the added burden of
proof make RICO unappealing as a tool for prosecutors? As this Note
suggests, the answer is no. Certainly, there are high evidentiary bur-
dens involved with RICO. But, as illustrated above, because the RICO
prosecutor must prove more, he can prove more. The evidence re-
quired to show a criminal "enterprise" and predicate acts for a "pat-
tern of racketeering activity," might otherwise be excluded in a
standard case. By making the case more complicated, RICO may facil-
itate conviction of the defendant, along with the added possibility of
bringing down a criminal enterprise.?
Many children hear the story of Brer Rabbit and the briar patch.
Brer Fox and Brer Bear didn't like Brer Rabbit and did everything
they could to catch him. One day, they finally caught him. Brer
Rabbit shouted, "Do whatever you want to me, but please don't throw
me into the briar patch!" Bear and Fox naturally do exactly what he
asked them not to do. After some loud yells of "anguish," Rabbit takes
some time to laugh at his foolish adversaries. The briar patch is Brer
4 See FED. R. Evm. 404(b). Many states have similar provisions in their Rules of
Evidence. Trial judges will inevitably have a great deal of discretion in such matters.
Again, the prosecutor will have several options. See supra note 2.
5 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994). Also discussed in this Note as a case study will
be the Florida RICO statute, FLA. STAT. ch. 895.01-.09 (1996).
6 This is an oversimplification, but for present purposes it suffices. All crimes
have sophisticated proofs as part of securing a conviction. It is the large amount of
evidence that becomes relevant in a RICO case that makes it a useful tool here.
7 Although the point has been made that RICO can be a useful tool against
gangs, see Destro, supra note 1, at 797-801 and Bonney, supra note 1, emphasizing the
added bonus of a RICO conviction in an attempt to bring down the entire enterprise
is important to ensuring that it is used as a tool to combat gangs.
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Rabbit's home: he likes nowhere better and his protests were all for
show.
Much like Brer Rabbit's briars, prosecutors can find a home in
RICO. If they look to state or federal RICO in order to prove a diffi-
cult evidentiary case, they can go into an area that seems more dan-
gerous than it is. One can almost hear prosecutors, much like Brer
Rabbit, shouting, "Do whatever you want to me, but don't make me
prove this complex RICO case!" As this Note will demonstrate, prose-
cutors should get to know their "briar patch" and use the resources of
RICO to do their job more effectively.
Prosecutors have four options in this hypothetical. First, they can
choose to "throw in the towel" and let a suspected murderer walk the
streets because of difficulty with the case. Second, they can indict the
defendant on the charge of murder and take their chances. Third, a
prosecutor can indict the defendant and the gang under the state
RICO statute. Finally, the prosecutor can choose to "hand off' the
case to a federal prosecutor, and let him indict the defendant and the
gang under federal RICO. As this Note will show, a comparison be-
tween RICO and non-RICO cases makes options Three and Four very
attractive.8
Part II will examine the federal RICO statute and set the stage for
arguments in favor of the use of both federal and state RICO. Parts
III, IV, and V will analyze the basics of Florida's RICO statute, Flor-
ida's Evidence Code, and the case law in both RICO and non-RICO
cases. 9 Parts VI and VII will analyze Federal Rules of Evidence 403
8 There is a fifth option. Another possibility that has not been discussed here is
the possibility of suing the federal RICO defendant in state court. This is permissible,
as indicated in Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 465 (1990) ("We have full faith in the
ability of state courts to handle the complexities of civil RICO actions, particularly
since many RICO cases involve asserted violations of state law, such as state fraud
claims, over which state courts presumably have greater expertise."). Since this Note
is designed to focus on the criminal aspects of RICO, this option will not be ad-
dressed. It does show the flexibility and vast scope of RICO, however.
9 Florida is used for several reasons. First, it possesses a state RICO statute. Sec-
ond, it has an evidence code which is nearly identical to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, as will be shown in the following pages. Finally, Florida's RICO statute is
currently the focus of a great deal of controversy. The State of Florida used that
statute to prosecute tobacco companies that have "deliberately misled the public"
concerning cigarette safety and design. Documents Could Smoke Out Tobacco Industry
Conspiracy, TAMPA TRIB., March 22, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 7041346. It drew a
great deal of attention, particularly from the legal community: "[T]his Court has
signed more orders in this one case admitting lawyers pro hoc vice than in all the
Court's prior cases in all divisions put together over the past twenty years. The
number of lawyers on this one case for the defense (and for the State) is mind-bog-
gling." State v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466, 1996 WL 788371, at *5 (Fla.
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and 404(b), as well as federal case law, both RICO and non-RICO.
After laying down that foundation, Part VIII will draw some conclu-
sions about the advantages of choosing state or federal RICO in a
complex evidentiary case.
I. FEDERAL RICO AT A GLANCE
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) was passed in 1970 as part of the Organized Crime Control
Act.10 Congress set out the purposes it envisioned when it created
RICO:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime is a highly sophis-
ticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually draws bil-
lions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and
the illegal use of force, fear, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized
crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained
from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking,
the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution
of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social
exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to in-
filtrate and corrupt legitimate businesses and labor unions and to
subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime
activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's
economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organiza-
tions, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate
and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and under-
mine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) or-
ganized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-
gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the le-
gally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other
sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those en-
gaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies
available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and
impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized
crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions,
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."
Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 1996) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss). This suit was re-
cently settled for over eleven billion dollars. See Tobacco Settles Fla. Suit: Cigarette Makers
To Pay $11.3 Billion, CH. TRm., Aug. 25, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 3581897.
10 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
11 RICO, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
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RICO supplements the current justice system, and is a tool to eradi-
cate organized crime. Considering these purposes, it seems logical
that state and federal jurisdictions should use the broad capabilities of
RICO as much as possible. While some criticize RICO as "The Mon-
ster That Swallowed Jurisprudence," in reality it is an innovation in
individual and enterprise liability that still has a great deal of untap-
ped potential. 12
A few points concerning the statute and its elements need to be
made. Section 1962 of RICO makes four activities unlawful:
(a) using or investing income derived from a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity to acquire any interest in, or the establishment or opera-
tion of an enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate commerce;
(b) acquiring or maintaining any interest or control, through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity in an enterprise that is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate commerce;
(c) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity that is engaged in, or the activities of Which
affect, interstate commerce; and
(d) conspiracy to violate (a) through (c).13
The elements of RICO are the subjects of vast amounts of literature
and many Supreme Court opinions. In order to be convicted under
RICO, one must be a "person" (an entity capable of acquiring an in-
terest in property). This person must commit at least two predicate
offenses (which include state and federal offenses-from murder to
mail fraud), making a "pattern of racketeering activity." Federal
RICO also requires the presence of an "enterprise," as discussed in
§ 1962. This "enterprise" must be a formal or informal organization,
affecting interstate commerce in some manner. If a prosecutor can
prove the pattern of racketeering along with the "enterprise" and a
violation of some subsection of § 1962, serious criminal penalties can
result.1 4
Jurisdiction is a concern with federal RICO. In order to violate
federal RICO, the criminal "enterprise" has to affect, or be engaged
12 The current criticisms seem to focus on civil RICO and the forfeiture provi-
sions of criminal RICO. While these tools are controversial, the effectiveness of RICO
as a whole is not controversial. Organized crime is a dangerous force in any society,
and currently RICO is one of the best tools to combat it. What is offered in the
following pages may arguably be an extension of that purpose, but it stills goes to the
heart of Congressional intent: "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States." § 1, 84 Stat. at 941.
13 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
14 See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968.
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in, interstate commerce. A gang may not always fit this description.
For purpose of the argument, therefore, the hypothetical assumes that
the gang engages in several commercial activities, including the sale of
drugs and the purchase of weapons. These activities should place the
gang within the realm of interstate commerce. Therefore, if the other
requirements of federal RICO, such as the "pattern" and the "enter-
prise" elements, are met, the prosecutor will be able to "hand off' this
case to a federal prosecutor. While this is only a basic overview of the
requirements of federal RICO, it is enough of an introduction for the
purposes of this discussion.
III. FLORIDA RICO AT A GLANCE
While there are many state RICO statutes, for the purposes of this
Note it is appropriate to look at Florida's15 as a sample of the possibili-
ties state RICO statutes offer. Florida passed its RICO statute in
1977,16 with several legislative findings:
WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that organized crime is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread problem which annually
drains billions of dollars from the nationwide economy by various
patterns of unlawful conduct, including the illegal use of force,
fraud, and corruption, and
WHEREAS, organized crime exists on a large scale within the state
of Florida, and it engages in the same patterns of unlawful conduct
which characterizes its activities in other states .... 17
As these findings indicate, Florida's Legislature passed RICO in order
to combat organized crime. While there might be some debate con-
cerning exactly what the term "organized crime" means, a modern
street gang should fit into the definition. This is particularly true in
Florida, as the definition of "enterprise" within the Florida RICO stat-
ute includes a "group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity";1 8 and "illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental,
as well as other, entities."' 9 This definition is broader than the federal
RICO definition of "enterprise," as discussed in Part 11.20
While Florida's RICO statute is, of course, governed by Florida
law, it is important to note that federal case law on federal RICO will
15 See supra note 9 for an explanation of the choice of Florida's RICO statute.
16 FLA. STAT. ch. 895.01-.09 (1996).
17 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 77-334.
18 FLA. STAT. ch. 895.03 (1996).
19 lId
20 See, e.g., Jennifer Daley, Tightening the Net of Florida's RICO Act, 21 FiA. ST. U. L.
REv. 381, 396-99 (1993). The Federal RICO definition of "enterprise" does not in-
clude a reference to licit and illicit enterprises. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994).
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also be an important consideration for a court. As stated in O'Malley
v. St. Thomas University, Inc., "[s]ince Florida RICO is patterned after
federal RICO, Florida courts have looked to the federal courts for gui-
dance in interpreting and applying the act .... Federal decisions
should be accorded great weight."21 When considering the case study
of Florida RICO, it is important to remember that the parallel discus-
sions in Parts VI and VII concerning federal RICO are relevant.
IV. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FLORIDA'S RICO STATUTE AND
RULE 90.403
A. Florida Rule 90.403
Florida Evidence Code section 90.403 provides, in part,
"[r]elevant evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of is-
sues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."22 This provision is substantially similar to Federal Rule of
Evidence 403.23 Florida trial courts will not admit evidence that is "so
inflammatory as to create an undue prejudice in the minds of the jury
and detract them from a fair and unimpassioned consideration of the
evidence," 24 if that prejudice substantially outweighs the evidence's
probative value. This determination is within the discretion of the
trial judge,25 who should consider the following factors: "the need for
the evidence, the tendency of the evidence to suggest an improper
basis for the jury to resolve the matter, such as on an emotional basis,
the chain of inference necessary to establish the material fact, and the
effectiveness of a limiting instruction."26
The importance of Evidence Code section 90.403 cannot be un-
derstated. It has implications with just about every item of evidence
that will come up in a trial. Florida courts have affirmed the trial
court's admission of evidence such as testimony tending to prove gun
21 O'Malley v. St. Thomas Univ., Inc., 599 So. 2d 999, 1000 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992).
22 FLA. STAT. ch. 90.403 (1996).
23 See FED. R. EvID. 403. A 1978 revision to the Florida Evidence Code eliminated
the phrase "undue waste of time," which appears in the Federal Rule.
24 Young v. State, 234 So. 2d 341, 348 (Fla. 1970) (quoting Leach v. State, 132 So.
2d 329, 331-32 (Fla. 1961)).
25 See, e.g., Collier v. State, 681 So. 2d 856, 858 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("[A]
trial court's decision to admit the evidence will not be disturbed absent a showing of
an abuse of discretion.") (citations omitted).
26 State v. Sawyer, 561 So. 2d 278, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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ownership, 27 threats toward a battery defendant,28 testimony that a de-
fendant is an escaped fugitive, 29 evidence suggesting premeditation in
a murder case,30 and diary excerpts implicating the defendant.A'
While Florida appellate courts tend to defer to the discretion of the
trial court,32 it is important to note that they will reverse if they deter-
mine that the trial court has abused its discretion by admitting or not
admitting evidence.33 In a great majority of cases, however, a Florida
27 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 683 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reviewing
firearms possession conviction; defendant objected to use of his videotaped state-
ments concerning a gun he owned; affirmed because evidence went to the essential
element of possession and therefore was probative enough to outweigh any
prejudice).
28 See, e.g., Collier, 681 So. 2d at 858 (reviewing battery and false imprisonment
conviction; defendant objected to use of victim's statement detailing threat made by
defendant; affirmed, even though prejudicial, because highly probative as to intent).
29 See, e.g., Peterka v. State, 640 So. 2d 59, 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (reviewing
murder conviction; defendant objected to testimony that he was an escaped fugitive;
affirmed because limiting instruction "eliminated any prejudice").
30 See, e.g., Miller v. State, 605 So. 2d 492, 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing
murder conviction; defendant objected to evidence that he requested his gun prior to
the murder; affirmed because highly probative as to premeditation).
31 See, e.g., Obojes v. State, 590 So. 2d 461, 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd on
other grounds, 604 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1992) (reviewing burglary, robbery, kidnapping,
and sexual battery conviction; defendant objected to use of diary excerpts implicating
him; affirmed because necessary to prosecution's case, and no limiting instruction
requested).
32 See, e.g., Smith, 683 So. 2d at 578; Collier, 681 So. 2d at 858; Peterka, 640 So. 2d at
68; Miller, 605 So. 2d at 494; Obojes, 590 So. 2d at 461.
33 See, e.g.,Jones v. State, 678 So. 2d 890. 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (reviewing
burglary conviction; defendant not permitted to testify about state witness' hostility
toward him to show bias; reversed because prejudicial references to witnesses' homo-
sexuality not enough to outweigh probative value of impeachment); Keller v. State,
586 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reviewing sexual battery conviction;
defendant objected to use of witness testimony that defendant attempted to get wit-
ness to lie on his behalf; reversed because vague, speculative, irrelevant, and highly
prejudicial); Czubak v. State, 570 So. 2d 925, 928-29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (re-
viewing murder conviction; defendant objected to use of gruesome photographs of
victim; reversed on other grounds, but court required remand to assess probative
value and whether gruesome nature was due to causes above and beyond the killing);
Wilkins v. State, 561 So. 2d 1339, 1340 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (reviewing drug
conviction; defendant objected to characterization of location of arrest as "high crime
area known for narcotics"; reversed because testimony created "an indelible impres-
sion that Wilkins was there for no other purpose than to deal in drugs"); Palmer v.
State, 548 So. 2d 277, 277-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (reviewing burglary convic-
tion; defendant objected to evidence that he signed out of a work release center on
day of the crime; reversed because "prejudicial effect was too great" and presence at
scene obtainable by other means).
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trial court's determination on the admissibility of evidence will be
affirmed.
B. Florida's RICO Possibilities
Florida RICO and Florida Evidence Code 90.403 are rarely men-
tioned together in Florida cases, so it is difficult to assess their interac-
tion directly. Even without cases that directly draw the relationship,
however, there are certain principles within the nature of RICO that
suggest their relationship. As mentioned in Part I, a prosecutor can
make the defendant's gang a RICO criminal "enterprise." In order to
win a RICO prosecution, the prosecutor must bring in the gang. Flor-
ida's rules for an "enterprise" demand it, as indicated in Part III. A
single defendant acting alone is not an "enterprise. '34 A RICO "enter-
prise" must have an existence separate and apart from the "pattern of
racketeering activity."35 In other words, the "enterprise" must be an
ongoing organization, formal or informal, with various associates who
function as a unit, and with an identifiable decision making
structure. 3
6
These requirements make pleading the defendant's gang mem-
bership unavoidable; the charge will fail without it. Because of this,
the gang becomes an essential part of the RICO charge, and therefore
evidence of the gang is highly probative. In all likelihood, a trial
judge will permit the inclusion of gang membership in this case de-
34 See, e.g., State v.Jackson, 677 So. 2d 938, 941 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (review-
ing RICO charge dismissal; defendant involved in financial asset conversion scheme;
reversed because state alleged proper "enterprise" by linking individual defendant to
a law firm and financial activities and that action in concert was sufficient); Flanagan
v. State, 566 So. 2d 868, 869-70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (reviewing RICO conviction;
defendant involved in stolen merchandise resale scam; reversed because "enterprise"
requirement should be strictly construed and defendant that apparently acted alone
did not satisfy a strict construction).
35 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 652 So. 2d 877, 879-80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (re-
viewing RICO conviction; defendant directs others to cash stolen checks; reversed
because no evidence of ongoing organization and no evidence that other members
knew of each other led to conclusion that "enterprise" was not more than the "pat-
tern"); Clark v. State, 645 So. 2d 575, 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (reviewing RICO
conviction; defendant involved in purse-snatching and false identification scheme; af-
firmed because jury question of "enterprise" was presented when defendant coordi-
nated activities of a group to steal wallets and then falsify identification to draw from
the bank accounts of the victims).
36 See, e.g., State v. Rutledge, 611 So. 2d 1263, 1264-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(reviewing RICO conviction; possession and sale of cocaine; dismissal affirmed be-
cause telephone conversations concerning buy/sell transactions between two of the
defendants were not enough to demonstrate that organization was ongoing, or had a
decision making structure).
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spite the possibility of prejudicial inferences. As will be demonstrated
in Part VI, this is precisely what happens in many federal RICO cases.
Because of the guidance Florida courts get from federal RICO deci-
sions, Florida courts will probably take this federal attitude into ac-
count when ruling on the admissibility of gang membership evidence.
V. THE INTERATION BETWEEN FLORIDA'S RICO STATUTE AND
RULE 90.404(2)
A. Florida Rule 90.404(2)
Florida Evidence Code section 90.404(2) (a) provides:
Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible
when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity
or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the
evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity.3 7
The section is virtually identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).31
Any evidence of this sort must have a proper purpose, as determined
in the trial court's discretion. The trial court's determination will be
reviewed for an abuse of that discretion.39 Trial courts are guided by a
four-step standard to determine whether the prior bad act evidence is
admissible: (1) the evidence must be relevant and have probative
value in proof of the instant case or some material fact or facts in
issue, (2) the evidence's sole purpose is not to show bad character, (3)
the evidence's sole purpose is not to show the propensity of the ac-
cused to commit the crime charged, and (4) the evidence's admission
is not precluded elsewhere. 40 Evidence which is used solely to prove
propensity or bad character is presumed to be harmful.41
If a proper purpose for admitting prior bad act evidence is found,
the admission of the evidence will be affirmed. Proper purposes in-
clude opportunity,42 identity,43 and absence of mistake.44 Florida ap-
37 FLA. STAT. ch. 90.404(2) (a) (1997).
38 See FED. R. Evm. 404(b); see also infra Part VII(A).
39 See, e.g., Saffor v. State, 625 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 660 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1995).
40 See, e.g., Green v. State, 190 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
41 See, e.g., Abbott v. State, 622 So. 2d 601, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
42 See, e.g., State v. Rawls, 649 So. 2d 1350, 1353-54 (Fla. 1995) (reviewing sexual
battery conviction; defendant objected to admission of past sex crimes; reversed on
other grounds, but court held that past sex crimes admissible to prove opportunity,
since defendant gained access to all of his victims in the same manner).
43 See, e.g., Grump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963, 967-68 (Fla. 1993) (reviewing murder
conviction; defendant objected to admission of prior murders; affirmed because "cu-
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pellate courts will reverse if no proper purpose is shown. 45 In
addition, if the crimes are "inseparable," section 90.404(2) does not
apply.46 Florida appellate courts routinely defer to the trial court's
discretion. Therefore, a trial court's decision not to let in the hypo-
thetical gang member's "hits" will probably stand. The scenario
changes if Florida's RICO statute is used.
B. Forida's RICO Possibilities
As with section 90.403 of the Florida Evidence Code, section
90.404(2) is rarely mentioned in RICO cases. However, there are cer-
tain details of the law surrounding the "pattern of racketeering activ-
ity" that are important. In order to prosecute under RICO, the state
must demonstrate two or more "predicate acts" to constitute a "pat-
tern of racketeering activity." These predicate acts cannot arise out of
the same incident.47 As with federal RICO, the "pattern" requirement
is glossed to include a "continuity" requirement: basically, there must
be a threat of continued criminal activity. 48 Failure to inform the jury
mulative effect of the numerous similarities between the two crimes establishes an
unusual modus operandi which identifies Crump as Clark's murderer").
44 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 621 So. 2d 413, 417 (Fla. 1993) (reviewing sexual
battery and kidnapping conviction; defendant objected to admission of prior sexual
assaults; affirmed because prior knowledge of lack of consent with other victims pro-
bative to rebut defense of consent as absence of mistake).
45 See, e.g., Saffor v. State, 660 So. 2d 668, 671-72 (Fla. 1995) (reviewing sexual
battery conviction; defendant objected to use of other sex crime; reversed because
only similarity was familial context and additional showing of similarity necessary to
make other crimes admissible to show identity); Holland v. State, 636 So. 2d 1289,
1293 (Fla. 1994) (reviewing murder conviction; defendant objected to admission of
prior scuffle with police; reversed because record reflects no proper purpose and ad-
mission presumed to be harmful); Henry v. State, 574 So. 2d 73, 74-75 (Fla. 1991)
(reviewing murder conviction; defendant objected to admission of murder of previ-
ous wife's son; reversed because no identifiable proper purpose and not part of "con-
tinuing criminal episode").
46 See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966, 969 (Fla. 1994) (reviewing murder and
grand theft conviction; defendant objected to admission of theft of car keys used to
steal car; affirmed because theft of car keys necessary to steal car in first place, "inex-
tricably intertwined" to the crime charged and therefore not "other crimes"
evidence).
47 See, e.g., Watts v. State, 558 So. 2d 142, 144 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (reviewing
RICO conviction; defendant involved in racketeering, kidnapping, and burglary
scheme; reversed because all predicate acts arose out of same incident; "proper target
of RICO prosecution will be the career criminal") (citations omitted).
48 See, e.g., Brown v. State, 652 So. 2d 877, 880-81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (re-
viewing RICO conviction; defendant directed others to cash stolen checks; reversed
because scheme was limited by number of checks cashed and posed no threat of long-
term existence); Shimek v. State, 610 So. 2d 632, 635 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (re-
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of this requirement is reversible error.49 A series of acts, from several
drug transactions50 to a kidnapping and murder plota should satisfy
the requirement. These predicate acts can generally include charged
or uncharged criminal acts. 52
The presence of a RICO charge makes inclusion of prior murders
less problematic. As prior activities of the criminal "enterprise,"
whether charged or uncharged, these prior criminal acts can be in-
cluded as predicate acts. Because of the requirement of at least two
predicate acts not arising out of the same incident, they must be in-
cluded in order to meet the "pattern" requirement. Part VII will show
that the federal courts have consistently ruled that federal RICO al-
lows the inclusion of prior criminal acts in this manner. As those fed-
eral decisions will serve as guidance for the Florida courts, trial judges
will likely keep such a practice in mind when determining the admissi-
bility of prior criminal acts evidence.
VI. INTERAMTION BETWEEN FEDERAL RICO AND FEDERAL RuLE OF
EVIDENCE 403
A. Rule 403
If a state RICO prosecution is not the answer for a particular pros-
ecutor, he may "hand off' the case and make it a federal RICO ac-
tion.53 Federal Rule of Evidence 402 provides: "All relevant evidence
viewing RICO conviction; grand thefts as predicate offenses; reversed on other
grounds, but "grand scale" and links between incidents satisfied continuity); State v.
Lucas, 600 So. 2d 1093, 1094-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reviewing RICO convic-
tion; defendant involved in investment scandal; dismissal of charges quashed because
threat of continuing activity met since practice of defrauding customers was part of
regular course of business).
49 See, e.g., Shimek, 610 So. 2d at 638-39.
50 See, e.g., Schremmer v. State, 578 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(reviewing RICO conviction; drug defendant; affirmed because participation in four
interrelated drug ventures over two-year period sufficient to allege "pattern").
51 See, e.g., Domberg v. State, 518 So. 2d 1360, 1361-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(reviewing RICO conviction; kidnapping and murder defendant; affirmed even
though predicate acts were committed out of state).
52 See, e.g., Domberg, 518 So. 2d at 1361 (holding that uncharged criminal acts
"established an ongoing pattern of criminality generally involving similar offenses and
the same participants").
53 It is important to note once again that this may not be the ideal option for
many state prosecutors. Local district attorneys may not want to give up a case, de-
spite its difficulty, that can protect their community like a conviction of a murderer
will. However, if a state RICO case is impossible or not prudent, this may be the best
option as far as justice is concerned. This may also be the only other option to a
murder charge in those states without their own RICO statute.
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is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the
United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evi-
dence which is not relevant is not admissible."54 This Rule is the
guide to trial judges in determining the admissibility of evidence. But,
as provided for in Rule 402, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 serves as a
limitation on the admissibility of evidence: "Although relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."55 This limita-
tion has been the subject of a great deal of debate. Despite the de-
bate, it is true that "much leeway is given trial judges who must fairly
weigh probative value against probable dangers."56
Rule 403 is a common tool used by both prosecutors and defense
attorneys to convince the judge that evidence is inadmissible. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Abel, the defendant, accused of bank robbery,
wished to use the testimonial evidence of one Mills to show that he
did not participate in the robbery. Over defense objection, the prose-
cution showed that the defendant and Mills were both members of
the Aryan Brotherhood, a prison organization that was willing to "lie,
cheat, steal [and] kill"57 to help one another. This evidence im-
peached the witness for bias toward the defendant, and the defendant
was convicted.
The Supreme Court considered whether cross-examination for
bias had survived promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, as
no Rule specifically mentions bias as grounds for impeachment. The
Supreme Court ruled that it did survive, as "[a] successful showing of
bias on the part of a witness would have a tendency to make the facts
to which he testified less probable in the eyes of the jury than it would
be without such testimony."58 In addition, the defendant argued
before the Court that a full description of the prison gang and its
objectionable beliefs was unfairly prejudicial. The Court responded:
"This argument ignores the fact that the type of organization in which
54 FED. R. EVID. 402.
55 FED. R. EVID. 403.
56 CHARLES McCoRMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185 (John William Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992); see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984) ("A district
court is accorded a wide discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence under
the Federal Rules.").
57 Abe4 469 U.S. at 48.
58 Id. at 51.
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a witness and party share membership may be relevant to show bias."59
The Court also indicated that precautions such as not allowing use of
the name Aryan Brotherhood and limiting instructions reduced the
risk of unfair prejudice. 60
Numerous situations in which Rule 403 applies exist.61 The cir-
cuit courts review evidentiary issues such as ajudge's opinion in a pre-
vious disposition, 62 membership in a particular ethnic group,63 the
ability of government witnesses to coordinate their testimony as a
credibility issue,64 expert testimony concerning reliability of eyewit-
59 Id. at 54.
60 Id.
61 It is important to recognize that a great many cases in which the trial court
excludes evidence in its discretion are not reviewed by the appellate courts. If a de-
fendant is acquitted, the case is generally not reviewed. It is important, therefore, to
look at the trial court's use of their discretion in the district courts as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pitner, 969 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (W.D. Wash. 1997) (excluding poly-
graph evidence in a firearms case because probative value slight and "[w]hen scien-
tific evidence is presented to jurors with representations that the results are, for
example, 98% accurate, there is a substantial risk that the jurors will substitute the
examination results for their own judgment"); United States v. Saya, 961 F. Supp.
1395, 1397 (D. Haw. 1996) (excluding defendant's expert testimony concerning ef-
fect of drug use on government witness because expert's testimony was improper
under standard for expert testimony, and even if proper, it was "speculative and hypo-
thetical," and therefore prejudice outweighed probative value); United States v.
Stoecker, 920 F. Supp. 867, 875-76 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (excluding evidence that banks
suffered financially in bank fraud case because not an element of the offense and "at
best marginally probative and highly prejudicial to the defendants"); United States v.
Erickson, 794 F. Supp. 273, 275 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (excluding evidence of defendant's
possession of 32 weapons not used in the charged bank robbery because while rele-
vant as "tools of the trade," evidence was "highly inflammatory and may be misused by
the jury").
62 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 405-06 (3d Cir. 1996) (review-
ing mail fraud and money laundering conviction; "background information" from a
Commonwealth Court opinion was read into evidence concerning the fraudulent em-
ployee benefit plan created by defendant; affirmed because jury instruction limited
usage permitted to the jury as opinion evidence and was probative to the factual basis
of the mail fraud scheme).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 1996) (reviewing
drug conviction; defendants objected to use of their Colombian passports because of
the associations between Colombia and the drug cartels; passports also served the
purpose of showing defendants presence at a particular location; court asserted that
the drug inference will not necessarily be made, and that any argument of unfair
prejudice was specious); United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1078-79 (6th Cir.
1993) (reviewing drug conviction; defendant argued that mentioning his connections
with Colombia would be unfairly prejudicial; court ruled Colombian connections
were relevant to identity in drug conspiracy and were not inflammatory).
64 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1443-44 (7th Cir. 1996) (re-
viewing drug conspiracy conviction; defendants tried to contradict proof of witnesses'
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ness testimony, 65 statements made by a federal agent as a result of
torture and interrogation, 66 statements made by a prosecutor in a pre-
vious hearing,67 the opinion of a law enforcement officer concerning
the guilt of a defendant before he is charged, 68 and the investigating
officer's reasons for beginning his inquiry.69 District courts will often
use their discretion to admit evidence that they feel is not unfairly
prejudicial.70 If there is a possibility that the trial court's decision to
admit (or not admit) evidence was unfairly prejudicial, circuit courts
will remand for a determination of the matter.71 In any case, federal
courts are very careful with evidence that could prejudice a defend-
limited motion while in jail to illustrate their credibility; trial court refused to admit
evidence of witnesses' period of time in the "open" portion of the jail, holding that it
was cumulative; reversed because prejudicial impact of refusing impeachment evi-
dence, combined with other irregularities, required a determination of whether the
irregularities affected the verdicts).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 534-36 (4th Cir. 1993) (review-
ing bank robbery conviction; trial court excluded expert testimony offered by defend-
ant regarding eyewitness unreliability; affirmed because probative value and accuracy
of testimony questionable and therefore was within discretion of trial court to
exclude).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1995)
(reviewing kidnapping and racketeering convictions; defendant objected to use of
recording of kidnapped federal agent's torture and interrogation because of prejudi-
cial nature; affirmed because of several legitimate purposes including statements
made, extent of agent's injuries, and intent and motive of kidnappers, combined with
limiting instruction to limit prejudice).
67 See, e.g., United States v. DeLoach, 34 F.3d 1001, 1005-06 (11th Cir. 1994)
(reviewing conviction for making false statements to obtain loans; trial court excluded
alleged "inconsistent" statement made by prosecutor in previous trial because ofjury
confusion; affirmed because trial court, in determining that statements were not "evi-
dence," did not abuse its discretion).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 936 F.2d 1508, 1520-22 (7th Cir. 1991) (re-
viewing robbery conviction; trial court excluded evidence of defendant's initial re-
lease without being charged because irrelevant and prejudicial, affirmed because law
enforcement officer's opinion concerning guilt irrelevant and therefore within discre-
tion to exclude).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 563-64 (10th Cir. 1987) (re-
viewing counterfeiting conviction; defendant argued that explanation of why the in-
vestigation began prejudiced his case; affirmed because defendant was only referred
to as a "white male from out-of-town," never directly, and explanation was hot prejudi-
cial in any other way).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 405-06 (3d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 1996); Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 768-69;
United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1078-79 (6th Cir. 1993); Freeman, 816 F.2d at
563-64.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1442-44 (7th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that refusal to admit impeachment evidence could have been prejudicial).
[VOL. 73:2
"DON'T THROW ME INTO THE BRIAR PATCH"1998]
ant.72 Circuit courts are reluctant, however, to overturn a district
court's use of its discretion.7 3 District courts are in a better position to
determine evidentiary concerns, and the circuit courts will not reverse
without a grave error on the part of the district court. There is no
guarantee that a trial court will not exercise its discretion in a manner
that will suppress important evidence.
B. The RICO Dfference
The landscape changes somewhat when prosecutors use RICO.
Because of the more sophisticated proofs involved, the probative value
of some of the evidence will increase. Evidence that tends to show the
existence and nature of an "enterprise" and evidence of acts that con-
stitute part of a "pattern of racketeering activity" is highly probative.
As long as there is a legitimate purpose served by the evidence, the
chances of it being kept out of the trial are small. Generally, if the
proffered evidence fits into the general RICO case, it will be admitted;
examples include evidence tending to show the definition of an "en-
terprise,"74 the "pattern of racketeering activity,"75 making a connec-
tion to "predicate acts,"76 or proving an essential element of a
72 See, e.g., Sokolow, 91 F.3d at 405-06 (holding that jury instruction limited usage
permitted to the jury); Matta-BaUesteros, 71 F.3d at 768-69 (affirming admission be-
cause of several legitimate purposes, combined with limiting instruction to limit
prejudice).
73 See, e.g., Sokolow, 91 F.3d at 405-06; Eltayib, 88 F.3d at 169; Matta-Ballesteros, 71
F.3d at 768-69; Phibbs, 999 F.2d at 1078-79; Freeman, 816 F.2d at 563-64.
74 See, e.g., United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1994) (reviewing
RICO conviction; defendants involved in conspiracy to commit murder to advance
within New York Mafia family objected to admission of evidence of murders commit-
ted by others as part of the gang war; affirmed because evidence probative of exist-
ence of the war, the enterprise's existence and nature, and court's careful
consideration of prejudice does not fail Rule 403 test); United States v. Castellano,
610 F. Supp. 1151, 1162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (reviewing RICO conviction; attorney's
involvement with conspiracy made him a witness in the case to show existence of an
"enterprise in fact"; defendant argued that allowing him to testify, thereby forcing
defendant to find new counsel, was prejudicial; holding that "the status of the person
through whom probative evidence is adduced is not one of Rule 403's concerns").
75 See, e.g., United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 585-88 (11th Cir. 1987) (re-
viewing RICO conviction; affirmed because kidnapping and murder not committed
by defendant admissible to show "pattern of racketeering activity," membership of
those involved in the conspiracy, and to show duration of the conspiracy).
76 See, e.g., United States v. Scarfo, 711 F. Supp. 1315, 1321-22 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(reviewing RICO conviction; evidence of flight and guns seized from defendant's
home; defendant argued that danger of jury concluding guilt without proper infer-
ences connecting flight to RICO charge and involvement in theft of guns seized was
unfair prejudice; court held that cooperation of co-conspirator could have led to the
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"predicate act," as in any criminal case.77 A prosecutor has a great
deal to prove in a RICO case. As a result, circuit courts will uphold a
district court's use of its discretion when a piece of evidence is logi-
cally connected to the case. Evidence that might not be admissible in
an ordinary criminal case may be admissible in a RICO case.
C. Summary
As shown above, judges infrequently use Rule 403 to exclude evi-
dence. However, when issues such as gang membership, as in Abel,78
or other class membership, like the Colombians in Eltayib79 and
Phibbs,80 are encountered, there is a definite danger of prejudice.
Although not all courts are sympathetic to this, it is important to con-
sider the wide latitude afforded to trial judges. In the hypothetical
situation of the gang member involved in a drive-by shooting, it is pos-
sible that the judge will perceive his membership in the gang as un-
fairly prejudicial. Because a jury might convict on that evidence and
gang stereotypes alone, the judge may exclude the evidence of gang
membership. Another possibility is the one argued by the defendant
in Abel the court could severely limit the references to and descrip-
tions of the gang. If the prosecutor's best chances of showing motive,
opportunity, or intent come from the gang membership, but the trial
court exercises its discretion to keep it out, acquittal becomes more
likely. Using RICO to prosecute the same case may solve the problem.
By using the gang as a criminal "enterprise," what was already proba-
tive information becomes more so. The danger of unfair prejudice
becomes less of an issue as the probative value begins to tip the scales.
flight, and was sufficiently connected to predicate acts so as to be highly probative;
court also held that any reference to the theft did not necessarily lead to ajury infer-
ence, and "pales" in comparison to other charged crimes, including murder).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 633-638 (5th Cir. 1982) (review-
ing RICO conviction; adult film ring led to murder and arson; defendants objected to
use of evidence, including statements of victim taken by FBI, recordings made by
informant, and witness protection program references; affirmed because evidence was
highly probative and limiting instructions minimized possibility of misuse; defendants
sought to get evidence of a conspiracy by the FBI to frame them admitted; also hold-
ing that risk of prejudice and jury confusion from this theory was high).
78 United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
79 United States v. Eltayib, 88 F.3d 157, 169 (2d Cir. 1996).
80 United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1078-79 (6th Cir. 1993).
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VII. INTERACTION BETWEEN FEDERAL RICO AND FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 404(B)
A. Rule 404(b)
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that
upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case
shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if
the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the gen-
eral nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.8 '
The rule "protects against the introduction of extrinsic act evidence
when that evidence is offered solely to prove character. '8 2 Even when
offered for a proper purpose, admission of "prior bad acts" is not au-
tomatic. As the Advisory Committee states, "[t] he determination must
be made whether the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the proba-
tive value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of
proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind
under Rule 403."'83 The prosecution cannot offer the evidence of
"prior bad acts" solely to show a propensity to commit the instant
crime. If propensity is a possible inference from the evidence that has
a legitimate purpose, the defense may receive a limiting instruction
under Federal Rule of Evidence 105.84
The Supreme Court commented on Rule 404(b) in Huddleston v.
United States.8 5 In that case, the defendant was convicted of possession
and sale of stolen videocassettes. The only material issue at trial was
whether or not the defendant knew the tapes were stolen when he
possessed and sold them. The government offered two pieces of simi-
lar act evidence in the case: (1) the defendant had participated in the
sale of several televisions obtained from Leroy Wesby, and they were
stolen, and (2) the defendant had participated in the sale of a large
quantity of appliances from Wesby, which were also stolen. Because
the defendant also got the tapes from Wesby, the prosecution argued
that the prior acts showed that defendant had knowledge that the
81 FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
82 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687 (1988).
83 FED. R. EvID. 404(b) advisory committee note (citations omitted).
84 See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691-92.
85 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
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tapes were also stolen. The district court instructed the jury that they
should not consider the "prior bad acts" as evidence of character, but
only as relating to defendant's knowledge.
The issue before the Supreme Court in this instance was whether
or not a trial court must make a preliminary finding concerning the
evidentiary basis for similar act evidence. Defendant's counsel argued
that the trial court must make a preliminary finding that the similar
event happened before allowing such evidence to go before the jury.
The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that "[t]he text [of 404(b)]
contains no intimation.., that any preliminary showing is necessary
before such evidence may be introduced for a proper purpose. If of-
fered for such a proper purpose, the evidence is subject only to gen-
eral strictures limiting admissibility such as Rules 402 and 403."86 In
holding that the admission of 404(b) evidence should be subject to
the general rules, the Court specifically mentioned that Rule 104(b)
would be important: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding
of the fulfillment of the condition."8 7 Using this analysis, the Court
concluded that "[g]iven this evidence, the jury reasonably could have
concluded that the televisions were stolen, and the trial court there-
fore properly allowed the evidence to go to the jury."88
Huddleston does not adopt a particular test for admission of prior
bad act evidence. The Supreme Court only gives the lower courts a
set of guidelines: Rule 404(b) is subject to the general rules of rele-
vance and admissibility, such as Rules 104(b), 402, and 403. The cir-
cuit courts of appeal have adopted their own tests. As with most
evidentiary issues, all circuits review for abuse of discretion.8 9
The First Circuit uses a two-prong test based on the text of Rule
404(b). The court will look for some "special" probative value of the
evidence, such as intent, preparation, and so on, as enumerated in the
Rule, and will then subject the evidence to Rule 403 analysis. 90 The
86 Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 687-88.
87 FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
88 Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691.
89 See, e.g., United States v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Curry, 79 F.3d 1489, 1494 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d
1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Scott, 48 F.3d 1389, 1396 (5th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Green, 40 F.3d 1167, 1174 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ballew,
40 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir.
1994); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1021 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v.
Hamilton, 684 F.2d 380, 384 (6th Cir. 1982).
90 See, e.g., Cassiere, 4 F.3d at 1021.
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Fourth Circuit looks to the relation of the evidence to the offense
charged, its reliability, and also tests the evidence with Rule 403.91
The Fifth Circuit analyzes the evidence to determine whether it is rele-
vant to an issue other than the character of the defendant, as well as
subjecting it to Rule 403.92 The Sixth Circuit requires that the prof-
fered evidence be material, substantially similar and near in time to
the offense charged, and it must withstand Rule 403 scrutiny.93 The
Seventh Circuit articulates the following four factors:
(1) the evidence is directed towards establishing a matter in issue
other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime
charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough
and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3)
the evidence is sufficient to support ajury's finding that the defend-
ant committed the similar act, and (4) the probative value of the
evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice (Rule 403).94
The Eighth Circuit requires that the evidence be for a purpose other
than character, similar in kind to the crime charged, and close to the
charged crime in time. In addition, there must be sufficient evidence
for the jury to find that the defendant committed the prior act, and
the evidence must also go through Rule 403 analysis. 95 The Ninth
Circuit uses five factors: (1) the act must prove a material element of
the offense for which the defendant is now charged, (2) in certain
cases, the prior conduct must be similar to the charged conduct, (3)
proof of the prior conduct must be based on sufficient evidence, (4)
the prior conduct must not be too remote in time, and (5) the proba-
tive value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect under
Rule 403.96 Rather than articulate its own test, the Tenth Circuit
points to the protections mentioned in Huddleston to analyze the issue:
(1) 404(b)'s requirement of a proper purpose, (2) 402's requirement
of relevance, (3) the prejudice test of 403, and (4) a Rule 105 limiting
instruction is always available. 97 The Eleventh Circuit requires that
the "prior bad act" contains the same intent as the charged offense,
91 See, e.g., Hayden, 85 F.3d at 159.
92 See, e.g., Scott, 48 F.3d at 1396; United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1393
(5th Cir. 1993).
93 See, e.g., Hamilton, 684 F.2d at 384.
94 See, e.g., United States v. Bursey, 85 F.3d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1996); Curry, 79 F.3d
at 1495.
95 See, e.g., United States v. Ballew, 40 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 1994).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Manning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 1995).
97 See, e.g., United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1094 (10th Cir. 1994).
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the jury could find that the defendant committed that prior offense,
and looks to Rule 403.98 The District of Columbia Circuit asks
whether there was a purpose other than to show bad character of the
defendant, and whether the prior offenses would be unfairly prejudi-
cial under Rule 403.99 All evidence is not subject to Rule 404(b), how-
ever. Some courts will determine that Rule 404(b) does not apply in a
given case.100
The circuit courts analyze evidence of prior bad acts according to
these tests and will not admit any evidence relating solely to bad char-
acter or propensity.10' Circuit courts will affirm a trial court's decision
98 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 40 F.3d 1167, 1174 (11th Cir. 1994).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Bruner, 657 F.2d 1278, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
100 See, e.g., United States v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1337 (5th Cir. 1996) (review-
ing tax evasion conviction; defendant argued that pre-indictment knowledge and dis-
regard of payroll tax obligation should not have been admitted; affirmed because
knowledge of obligations "inextricably intertwined" with crime charged); Ballew, 40
F.3d at 941 (reviewing wire and mail fraud conviction; defendant confronted with
evidence of previous thefts in scheme; affirmed because those thefts were part of the
same "scheme" to defraud); United States v. Wells, 995 F.2d 189, 192 (11th Cir. 1993)
(reviewing drug conviction; defendant faced with prior arrest and seizure of drugs;
failure to admit reversed because possession relates directly to charge of conspiracy to
possess and distribute); United States v. Portalla, 985 F.2d 621, 625 (1st Cir. 1993)
(reviewing use of prior conviction against parole revokee; affirmed because Federal
Rules of Evidence do not apply to a revocation hearing); Bruner, 657 F.2d at 1291-94
(reviewing drug conviction; defendant argued that evidence of prior sexual behavior
was used; "admission" affirmed because court found no evidence of this sort).
101 See United States v. Frankhauser, 80 F.3d 641, 648 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Although
logically relevant, 'propensity' or 'bad character' evidence carries an unacceptable
risk that ajury will convict for crimes other than those charged, or that it will convict,
although uncertain of guilt, because a bad person deserves punishment.").
As with Rule 403, many cases in which the trial court excludes evidence in its
discretion are not reviewed by the appellate courts. If a defendant is acquitted, the
case is generally not reviewed. Therefore, the district court's opinion is another valu-
able source of information. See, e.g., United States v. Gunn, 968 F. Supp. 1089, 1095
(E.D. Va. 1997) (severing trial counts in a drug case because of 404(b) implications
and stating that "[s] ince evidence that [defendant] is a felon for purposes of proving
that specific element of Count II would not be admissible at a separate criminal trial
on Count I, there is a manifest danger of prejudice to [defendant] stemming from
the government's appropriate introduction of prior crimes evidence in ajoint trial");
United States v. Escobar, 842 F. Supp. 1519, 1524-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (excluding evi-
dence of defendant's threats against United States officials and defendant's escape
plot in a drug case because evidence of threats not similar to crime charged and
therefore irrelevant, and escape plot occurred outside the scope of the conspiracy
and therefore not probative as to membership in the conspiracy); United States v.
Vargas, 702 F. Supp. 70, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (excluding evidence of previous homicide
in drug case because limited probative value towards intent outweighed by inflam-
matory nature of the evidence and stating that "[e]vidence having a strong emotional
or inflammatory impact may pose a risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant because
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concerning admissibility of evidence in a 404(b) situation if that evi-
dence had a legitimate purpose, such" as knowledge, 10 2 intent,10 3 or
state of mind.10 4 Another proper purpose is to show identity, if the
crimes show the same modus operandi or a "signature."'0 5 As with
it distracts the jury from the relevant issues of the case"); United States v. Liuzzo, 608
F. Supp. 1234, (S.D. Fla. 1985) (excluding evidence of bribes on previous occasions
in obstruction ofjustice case because they were not sufficiently similar and "risks the
severe prejudice against the Defendant in order to allow the Government to argue a
tenuous theory of intent").
102 See, e.g., United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1995) (review-
ing drug conviction; defendant confronted with evidence of prior arrest revealing
methamphetamine manufacturing materials; affirmed because the evidence showed
knowledge, was similar and not too remote, and express acknowledgment of Rule 403
was enough to demonstrate the balancing test was conducted); United States v. Man-
ning, 56 F.3d 1188, 1197 (9th Cir. 1995) (reviewing mail bomb murder conviction;
defendant confronted with prior bombing conviction; affirmed because prior convic-
tion showed knowledge of explosives and a limiting instruction was given); United
States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 1021-22 (1st Cir. 1993) (reviewing fraud conviction;
previous fraudulent acts in a "land flip" case must not go to character or be unfairly
prejudicial; affirmed, because evidence went to knowledge of how the scheme worked
and there was no "extraordinary evidence" showing abuse of discretion).
103 See, e.g., United States v. Hayden, 85 F.3d 153, 159 (4th Cir. 1996) (reviewing
drug conviction; admission of witness intimidation evidence to show consciousness of
guilt and criminal intent; affirmed because intimidation evidence went directly to
consciousness of guilt and criminal intent, was reliable, and was far more probative
than prejudicial); United States v. Curry, 79 F.3d 1489, 1495 (7th Cir. 1996) (review-
ing drug conviction; witnesses testified about previous crack sales by defendant; af-
firmed because evidence demonstrated intent to commit charged crime and limiting
instructions limited unfair prejudice); Manning, 56 F.3d at 1197 (reviewing mail
bomb murder conviction; defendant confronted with prior bombing conviction; af-
firmed because prior conviction showed intent and a limiting instruction was given);
United States v. Hamilton, 684 F.2d 380, 384-85 (6th Cir. 1982) (reviewing alteration
of.money conviction; evidence that defendant had passed a $2 bill altered to look like
a $20 bill admitted; affirmed because evidence could go to intent).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 48 F.3d 1389, 1396-97 (5th Cir. 1995) (review-
ing drug conviction; evidence of past agreement to sell cocaine; affirmed because the
evidence demonstrated state of mind, and prejudice minimized with a limiting in-
struction); United States v. Green, 40 F.3d 1167, 1174-75 (11th Cir. 1994) (reviewing
drug conviction; prior arrest for distribution of cocaine required the same intent as
charged offense and jury could find that defendant committed prior act; affirmed
because acts required same mental state and 1987 offense not too remote in time).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Bursey, 85 F.3d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1996) (reviewing
drug conviction; defendant sought to block admission of prior dealings with police;
affirmed because defendant "opened the door" and offered evidence for purpose of
identity); United States v. Sanchez, 988 F.2d 1384, 1393-94 (5th Cir. 1993) (reviewing
drug conviction; similarity of two heroin sales including charged offense showed a
clear "modus operandi" and evidence's prejudicial effect was outweighed by need for
evidence, closeness in time, and similarity); Hamilton, 684 F.2d at 384-85 (reviewing
alteration of money conviction; evidence that defendant had passed a $2 bill altered
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Rule 403, in most cases the circuit courts will defer to the district
court's discretion in a particular case, whether the court admitted the
evidence 10 6 or excluded it.10 7 Even if a trial court abuses its discre-
tion, a circuit court can also affirm if it considers the admission harm-
less error.108
B. The RJCO Difference
While there is a long list of exceptions, and courts generally give a
wide discretion to admitting such testimony, using "prior bad acts"
can still be a difficult and arbitrary process. In some circumstances, it
may be possible to use a RICO charge to get prior crimes admitted. If,
for example, a prosecutor indicts the hypothetical gang member
under RICO, previous behavior can be part of the "pattern of racke-
teering activity."
Many courts find Rule 404(b) inapplicable to the "other" acts
that come up in RICO cases. 10 9 As with Rule 403, courts tend to treat
to look like a $20 bill admitted; affirmed because evidence could go to identity, as a
"signature" crime involving the same modus operandi).
106 See, e.g., Bursey, 85 F.3d at 296; Hayden, 85 F.3d at 159; Curry, 79 F.3d at 1494;
Basinger, 60 F.3d at 1407; Manning, 56 F.3d at 1197; Scott, 48 F.3d at 1396; Cassiere, 4
F.3d at 1021-22; Sanchez, 988 F.2d at 1393-94; Hamilton, 684 F.2d at 384.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 1996) (reviewing
aiding and abetting arson conviction; trial court excluded evidence of another sus-
pect's prior arson; affirmed because probative value was slight, evidence did not fit
within an exception to the rule, and court was not required to make an explicit Rule
403 balancing test); United States v. Young, 952 F.2d 1252, 1259 (10th Cir. 1991)
(reviewing mail fraud conviction; trial court excluded evidence that witness had made
false accusations in the past; affirmed because testimony was collateral and not
impeaching).
108 See, e.g., United States v. Birch, 39 F.3d 1089, 1094 (10th Cir. 1994) (reviewing
assault on federal officer conviction; previous convictions for battery of an officer
used against defendant; affirmed because lack of proper purpose compared with
large amount of other evidence pointing to defendant was harmless error).
109 In many RICO prosecutions, the concern over Federal Rule 404(b) disappears.
Traditional crimes such as murder pose difficulties with "prior bad acts." But when
the RICO charge involves a scheme to defraud, consisting of the predicate acts of wire
and mail fraud, a different scenario exists. These predicate acts can be proven in
several ways. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient in several circuits. See, e.g., United
States v. Behr, 33 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 1994) (RICO; circumstantial evidence
enough to show intent to defraud); United States v. Copple, 24 F.3d 535, 545 (3d Cir.
1994) (same); United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1254 (4th Cir. 1993) (same);
United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 441 (6th Cir. 1984) (same). An elaborate effort to
conceal by the defendant can also demonstrate the scheme. See, e.g., United States v.
Olson, 925 F.2d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 1991) ("'Elaborate efforts at concealment pro-
vide powerful evidence of their own consciousness of wrongdoing.'") (quoting
United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 170 (7th Cir. 1985)). The scheme can also be
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"prior bad acts" evidence as an essential part of the RICO case,
whether as a part of the conspiracy or as necessary to put the RICO
evidentiary "puzzle" together.110 Because of the elements of the "en-
proven by a "willful blindness" by the defendant avoiding knowledge of the scheme.
See, e.g., United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 252-53 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
evidence that defendant deliberately closed his eyes sufficient proof); United States v.
Camuti, 78 F.3d 738, 744 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d
836, 846 (4th Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Bussey, 942 F.2d 1241, 1250-51 (8th
Cir. 1991) (same). If "willful blindness" cannot be proven, recklessness may be suffi-
cient. See, e.g., United States v. Hannigan, 27 F.3d 890, 892 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The spe-
cific intent element may be found from a material misstatement of fact made with
reckless disregard for the truth."); United States v. Wingate, 997 F.2d 1429, 1433
(11th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1992)
(same); United States v. Schaflander, 719 F.2d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).
While all of these methods of proving a scheme can involve "prior bad acts," it is also
possible to prove a scheme to defraud by demonstrating a course of conduct which
will necessarily include prior bad acts. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 1348,
1364 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a course of conduct can be sufficient evidence of
intent to defraud); United States v. Swinton, 75 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir. 1996) (hold-
ing that acts were "intrinsic" to scheme); United States v. Muscatell, 42 F.3d 627, 630
(11th Cir. 1995) (same). This is true, even if the uncharged offenses occur outside
the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Whitaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 736 F.2d 1341,
1347-48 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that acts admissible to show course of conduct de-
spite statute).
While proving the RICO case, a prosecutor may want to include "prior bad acts."
If they are part of the general scheme involved in the RICO case, "prior bad acts" can
be introduced to demonstrate a "pattern of racketeering activity." See, e.g., United
States v. Crockett, 979 F.2d 1204, 1211 (7th Cir. 1992). If uncharged offenses are
necessary to prove an "enterprise," the offenses are admissible because Rule 404(b)
no longer applies. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 108 F.3d 730, 738-40 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that because they are necessary to prove an enterprise, crimes demon-
strating membership in the enterprise are not cognizable under 404(b)); United
States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1378 (2d Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Ellison, 793
F.2d 942, 949 (8th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518,
1534-35 (7th Cir. 1985) (same). The Seventh Circuit requires that any acts to be
proven must be in the indictment, however. See United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d
489, 501 (7th Cir. 1986).
A RICO case involving a scheme to defraud can eliminate any Rule 404(b) prob-
lem. An "enterprise" must be more than a "pattern of racketeering activity." See
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). At most, the two will be cotermi-
nous. A scheme to defraud, as indicated above, can be proven with uncharged acts
within the scheme. Properly pled, it will also be coterminous with the "enterprise," as
the "enterprise" is being run through the "scheme," as a "pattern of racketeering
activity." Because all acts the prosecutor wants to prove are within the scheme and
necessary to the RICO case the "bad acts" are not "prior." Rule 404(b) does not
apply.
110 See, e.g., United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1430-31 (5th Cir. 1995) (review-
ing RICO conviction; defendants confronted with prior traffic stops that revealed
drugs and intoxication; Rule 404(b) held to not apply because "[u]ncharged offenses
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terprise" and "pattern" elements of RICO, prior acts, whether charged
in the indictment or not, generally become central features of any
case. They can show membership in a criminal "enterprise," participa-
tion in a conspiracy, or serve as predicate acts for a "pattern of racke-
teering activity." This does not mean that 404(b) is never used in a
RICO context. Some "prior bad acts" evidence will not mesh well into
the overall RICO case.' In that situation, courts will still attempt to
place the other acts within the various proper purposes enunciated in
404(b), such as identity, intent, or to create the overall "setting" of the
crime. However, circuit courts will reverse a trial court's incorrect as-
arising from the same transaction or series of transactions charged in the indict-
ment.., are not barred by the rule"; it was "part and parcel of the conspiracy itself");
United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1994) (reviewing RICO conviction;
street gang defendants confronted with beatings, extortion, and robbery; court held
that despite no mention in the indictment, the uncharged acts were direct evidence
of the conspiracy itself, and therefore Rule 404(b) was inapplicable); United States v.
Robertson, 15 F.3d 862, 869-73 (9th Cir. 1994), revd on other grounds, 514 U.S. 669
(1995) (reviewing RICO conviction; while other "prior bad acts" were not properly
admitted, evidence of forgery necessary to connect stolen property to the RICO "en-
terprise"); United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992) (reviewing
RICO conviction; testimony that drug and weapons defendant ordered the murder of
a rival; held admissible because it was "part of the very act charged," since it was done
in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy); United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553,
571-73 (3d Cir. 1991) (reviewing RICO conviction; murder conspiracy participants
faced with uncharged "Mafia" offenses; affirmed because evidence tended to prove
existence and nature of criminal "enterprise" and conspiracy, as well as acts taken in
furtherance of the conspiracy); United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1986)
(reviewing RICO conviction; prosecutors used evidence of poker games that took
place during gambling enterprise's conspiracy; affirmed because "plainly relevant to
the conspiracy").
111 See, e.g., United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280, 286-87 (1st Cir. 1990) (reviewing
RICO conviction; former police officer's violations of Boston Police Department regu-
lations ruled to fall under Rule 404(b), as they were "wrongs " or "acts"; admission
affirmed because relevant to intent, knowledge, and "completed the story of [his]
crime [s] by proving the immediate context of events near in time and place"); United
States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1333-36 (11th Cir. 1982) (reviewing RICO convic-
tion; waterfront union officials and employers previously convicted of RICO charge;
affirmed because extrinsic offenses similar and tended to prove intent and proper
limiting instruction minimized prejudice); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971,
1028-29 (5th Cir. 1981) (reviewing RICO conviction; evidence of false driver's license
relevant to prove identity); United States v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675, 681-82 (3d Cir.
1979) (reviewing RICO conviction; use of bribery evidence reversed where no evi-
dence of a proper purpose could be found; error not harmless because government's
failure to articulate a proper purpose indicates that jury would not be able to articu-
late one); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1067-68 (3d Cir. 1978) (reviewing
RICO conviction; evidence of similar acts used against former prison warden who was
accepting bribes; affirmed because evidence tended to show motive and intent in ac-
cepting the bribes).
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sessment of "prior bad act" evidence if it demonstrates an abuse of
discretion. 1 2
C. Summary
Trial courts have a great deal of discretion to determine the ad-
missibility of evidence. As a result, they are free to exercise their dis-
cretion with little fear of reversal. As long as the court applies the test
articulated by its particular circuit in response to a well-taken objec-
tion, a reversal is unlikely. The exceptions to Rule 404(b) vary and
this wide leeway brings a degree of uncertainty into the prosecution's
attempt to get "prior bad act" evidence admitted. As shown above,
using RICO does not shield evidence from the Federal Rules. What it
does, however, is ensure that the evidence necessary to prove the
RICO charge, such as prior murders, does not face as high a level of
scrutiny as would be the case otherwise. The various circuits have
complicated tests to analyze whether Rule 404(b) evidence is admissi-
ble. RICO predicate offenses, however, do not fall under Rule 404(b).
Even if the court decides to analyze the proffered acts, it will do so
under Rule 403 only. The fact that the acts are a vital part of the
charge makes the evidence highly probative and more able to with-
stand Rule 403 scrutiny.
VIII. CONCLUSION: "PLEASE DON'T THROw ME INTO THE
BRIAR PATCH"
RICO is often attacked for the manner in which it is being used
in the American legal system. Opponents most often point to civil
RICO, and complain that its current application is too broad. While
the criticisms and defenses of civil RICO are best left to others, crimi-
nal RICO has been a powerful force forjustice. Whether in federal or
state courts, RICO makes it easier to bring down the criminal enter-
prises that simple individual criminal liability cannot. In addition,
RICO's interaction with state and federal rules of evidence makes it a
powerful tool to handle a difficult evidentiary case.
As discussed above, Florida Rules of Evidence 90.403 and
90.404(2), as well as Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b), give
the trial judge a wide range of discretion in deciding the admissibility
of evidence. This creates a level of uncertainty that replacing a simple
criminal charge with a state or federal RICO charge avoids. A prose-
cutor Will have to prove much more than in a traditional criminal
112 See Pantone, 609 F.2d at 681-82 (holding that no evidence of a proper purpose
could be found).
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case, owing to the complexity of the RICO case. But in the course of
proving their case, prosecutors are able to sidestep many of the hur-
dles created by state and federal rules of evidence, as well as the state
and federal common law.
A question that arises is whether or not this method of charging
criminals is ethical. Some would argue that by using RICO in this
manner, the prosecutor has evaded the rules of evidence in order to
secure a conviction. Perhaps, some would argue, the integrity of the
evidentiary system should have priority over conviction. It is impor-
tant to consider, however, that the defendant might have gone free if
not for this tactic. Rules of evidence should to protect the defendant
from unfairness, not shield him from punishment for a crime. It may
be time to avoid the formalisms inherent in the rules of evidence in
order to put criminals behind bars. While prosecutors certainly like
convictions on their record, only a cynic would argue that convictions
(regardless of guilt) are their only goal.
Skepticism of the legal profession cannot be the only guide for
structuring the way the criminal justice system works. To put it
plainly: if using RICO furthers the ends of justice, then it should be
used. RICO is not a corrupt means to an end; rather, it is a different
means used to further the ends ofjustice. RICO should be a weapon
in every prosecutor's arsenal. Considering the particulars of each
case, a prosecutor has an additional choice on how best to serve the
ends of justice and to get the criminal off the street. With this in
mind, prosecutors should take the "briar patch" of RICO and make it
their home.
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